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Antebellum and Postbellum
Testamentary Transfers in Three
Kentucky Counties
Alberto B. Lopez*
This Article analyzes wills and inventories probated in three Kentucky
counties, Boone, Woodford, and Wayne Counties, between 1860 and 1870.
The results of the study show that married women in the three counties
generally did not execute wills during the sample period, which is an
expected result given the testamentary limitations imposed upon married
women by Kentucky law. Despite dual encumbrances imposed by common
and statutory law during the sample period, legislative and judicial action
before, during, and after the sampled decade illustrates the advance of
women's property rights in Kentucky. The Kentucky General Assembly
passed a number of private and public bills that expanded the testamentary
authority of married women after 1848, which is striking given the relative
absence of legislation that authorized wills by married women before 1848.
Furthermore, a number of testators placed assets in separate use trusts for
the benefit of daughters thereby allowing those daughters to transfer
separate states by will after marriage pursuant to Kentucky common and
statutory law. The authority to execute a will to dispose of a separate state
provided a married woman with an opportunity to express her intent on
paper with the sanction of law.
The largest difference between wills probated before and after 1865 is the
distribution of slaves. Notably, sampled testators opted to distribute slaves
to females (wives and daughters) with greater frequency than to males
(sons). Although women are historically depicted as bystanders to the slave
economy, testamentary gifts of slaves to women suggests a greater degree of
participation in the slave market than suggested by the traditional
narrative. Regardless of the distribution of slaves by gender, each and every
recipient of slaves by will did so before the ratification of the Thirteenth
Copyright @ 2020 Alberto B. Lopez. Professor of Law, University of Alabama
School of Law.
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Amendment in 1865. The passage of the Thirteenth Amendment not only
transformed enslaved persons to free persons, but also had a visible effect in
the recorded pages of probate books - slaves are listed in testamentary
instruments probated before 1865 but vanish in the wills and inventories of
decedents' estates after 1865.
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INTRODUCTION
From a historical perspective, the law that governs the transfer of
property at death by written instrument is, in a word, static. The legal
authority to transfer real property at death in a writing called a "will"
dates from the time of Henry VIII. Modern statutory witness and
signature requirements for execution have a common ancestor in
England's Wills Act of 1837.1 Unlike the ossification of execution
requirements,2 the type of property that may be distributed by will is
fluid. Recent advances in technology, for example, have created digital
assets that individuals expect to transfer by testamentary instruments at
death.3 A 2012 Wall Street Journal article reported that Americans
estimated their digital assets, such as emails, photos, or entertainment
files, to be worth the hard-to-believe sum of $55,000.00 on average.4
Whatever value is assigned to digital assets, courts and legislatures have
been pushed to address issues involving the passage of those assets
through a decedent's estate.5 Similarly, the emergence of Bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies presents new challenges for estate planners.6
The statutory formalities to transfer property by will have resisted
1 See Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 9 (Eng.), https://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/Will4andlVict/7/26/section/9 [https://perma.cc/4QK5-R8EN].
2 See C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform:
An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code "Harmless Error" Rule and the
Movement Toward Amorphism, Part One: The Wills Act Formula, The Rite of Testation, and
the Question of Intent: A Problem in Search of a Solution, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 177 (1991)
("In comparison to other statutory law, the wills acts have proved to be extraordinarily
resistant to change.").




5 See, e.g., Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 606-07 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013)
(examining whether a decedent's estate included his email account and
communications); Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, Revised, 2015, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=
f7237fc4-74c2-4728-81c6-b39a9lecdf22 (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
S6EV-U7P5] (listing the numerous jurisdictions that have enacted the proposed
statute).
6 See The Future is Here: Dealing with Bitcoins and Cryptocurrencies in Tax and Estate
Planning, ACTEC FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://actecfoundation.org/podcasts/
bitcoin-cryptocurrency-tax-estate-planning/ [https://perma.cc/P9M4-CP65] (describing
the development of cryptocurrencies and similar assets as "probably one of the most
significant changes that you will face as a trust and estates lawyer").
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change,7 but the definition of property that passes by will is in perpetual
flux.
The most transformational change in the definition of property
occurred following the conclusion of the Civil War. Before the war,
statutory law in slave states categorized an enslaved person as an
owner's real or personal property. An early law in the Virginia Colony,
for example, deemed slaves "to be real estate (and not chattels),"8 but
Virginia's Revised Code of 1819 declared that "[a]ll negro and mulatto
slaves, in all courts of judicature within this Commonwealth, shall be
held, taken and adjudged to be personal estate."9 Regardless of whether
slaves were real or personal property, the owners of such property had
the legal authority to buy, sell, mortgage, or purchase insurance policies
on the lives of enslaved persons.10 Furthermore, states imposed taxes
on human property much like any other property owned by an
individual." In short, enslaved persons were commodities subject to all
of the legal transactions that permitted an owner to exploit or protect
investments in property.
Because statutory law designated slaves as a species of property, an
enslaved individual was part of a decedent slaveowner's wealth that
could be distributed to new owners following a slaveowner's death. The
designation as real or personal property could be crucially important for
an enslaved person/family because of rules governing legal rights such
as dower that impacted the distribution of a decedent's estate.12 During
7 This is not to suggest that there has been o development in statutory law
regarding what might constitute a valid will. In 2001, Nevada enacted a statute
recognizing electronic wills, which relaxes traditional writing and signature
requirements. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2019). See generally Joseph Karl Grant,
Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will,
42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 108-11 (2008).
8 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL
THE LAws OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619,333
ch. XXIII § 11 (1823).
9 1 THE REVISED CODE OF THE LAws OF VIRGINIA 431 ch. 111 § 47 (1819).
10 See Bonnie Martin, Slavery's Invisible Engine: Mortgaging Human Property, 76 J.S.
HIST. 817, 822 (2010); Rachel L. Swarns, Insurance Policies on Slaves: New York Life's
Complicated Past, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/12/18/us/insurance-policies-on-slaves-new-york-lifes-complicated-past.html
[https://perma.cc/V3J3-P6KN].
11 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 86 (2d ed. 1985).
12 See, e.g., RICHARD H. STANTON, REVISED STATUTES OF KENTUCKY, APPROVED AND
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1851 AND 1851, AND IN FORCE FROM JULY 1, 1852;
WITH ALL THE AMENDMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY ENACTED, AND NOTES OF THE DECISIONS OF THE
COURTS OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY 425 (1860). See generally Roy W. Copeland, The
Nomenclature of Enslaved Africans as Real Property or Chattels Personal: Legal Fiction,
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the administration of an estate, personal representatives included slaves
in inventories of a decedent's real and personal property and affixed
values to them following appraisals as part of the process of probating a
testate or intestate estate.13 Upon distribution of a decedent's property,
an individual or family could be divided between intestate heirs or
testate takers to equalize the value received by each heir or sold to pay
a decedent owner's debts. Indeed, a number of Thomas Jefferson's slaves
were auctioned off to retire some of his debts following his death.1 4
After the conclusion of the Civil War, states ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment and its declaration that "[n] either slavery nor involuntary
servitude . . . shall exist within the United States. . . ."15 From that point
forward, human beings could no longer be included in the definition of
property regardless of state statutes to the contrary. The passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment and its elimination of human property,
however, triggered a Newtonian fit of law-making in both Congress and
southern states. In response to the Thirteenth Amendment, southern
states passed Black Codes that sought to preserve antebellum society. 16
Subsequently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866,17 but
doubts about its constitutionality prompted Congress to pass the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.18 Two years later, Congress again
entered the fray by barring states from prohibiting citizens from voting
with its enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 as well as
another Civil Rights Act in 1875.19 Despite the post-bellum flurry of
congressional activity, a mixture of politics and Supreme Court
decisions, such as the Slaughterhouse Cases and Civil Rights Cases,20
impeded the effort to combat the vestiges of slavery. The postwar seesaw
over civil rights cast doubt over the meaning of freedom for the newly
Judicial Interpretation, Legislative Designation, or Was a Slave a Slave by Any Other Name,
40J. BLACK STUD. 946 (2010).
13 A testator could, of course, waive the requirement of completing an inventory by
an express waiver in his/her will.
14 See HENRY WIENCEK, MASTER OF THE MOUNTAIN: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND His
SLAVES 263 (2012).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
16 See, e.g., An Act to Amend the Vagrant Laws of the State, Laws of Mississippi, Law
of the State of Mississippi ch. VI, § 2, at 91 (1865); Black Codes of Mississippi, TEACHING
AM. HIST., https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/black-codes-of-mississippi/
(last visitedJan. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5SJB-6RUN].
17 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
18 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
19 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
20 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-79 (1872).
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freed, but the change in definition of property imposed by the
Thirteenth Amendment cemented in probate courts - human beings
were no longer legal property to be transferred at the death of another
human being.
This Article examines the testamentary anatomy of wills in three
Kentucky counties from 1860 to 1870. Part I describes the three
counties sampled in this study - Boone, Woodford, and Wayne
Counties. Part I also outlines the method employed to obtain data for
this investigation as well as the specific data extracted from the probate
records from the three counties. Part II reports the results of the study
and provides a tentative analysis of those results. Like past studies,
males comprised the majority of testators during the period. Although
the overwhelming majority of probated wills were written by men,
Kentucky's General Assembly passed several private bills expressly
permitting married women to transfer property at death and, more
broadly, enacted numerous statutes that provided greater economic
opportunities for women. The combination of private bills and public
laws that equalized economic agency between femes covert, married
women, and femes sole, unmarried women, likely reflects the expansion
of women's rights post-1848. Furthermore, the data reveals that females
received enslaved persons via will with greater frequency than males,
which suggests that females were more involved in the slave economy
than traditionally depicted. As a corollary to the transfer of enslaved
persons to family members, few sampled testators chose to manumit
their enslaved persons by will and instead chose to transfer those
individuals to family members. This Article concludes that probate
records not only represent personal histories on a micro-level, but also
national history on a macro-level as the change in the definition of
property associated with the Thirteenth Amendment is reflected in the
testamentary instruments of the sample period.
I. SETTING AND METHODOLOGY
During the late eighteenth century, land-hungry speculators from
eastern Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania pushed
westward in search of fertile land upon which to homestead and
ultimately settled in what is now Kentucky.21 In fact, one of the counties
sampled in this study, Woodford County, was a county in Virginia prior
21 See WILLIAM E. RAILEY, HISTORY OF WOODFORD COUNTY, KENTUCKY 4 (1938).
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to Kentucky statehood.22 Although the other two counties used for this
study, Boone and Wayne Counties, do not predate Kentucky
statehood,23 the geographic combination of the three counties
exemplifies the push-pull of northern and southern influences within a
border state. Indeed, the three counties form a north-south axis through
the heart of Kentucky with Boone County the northernmost on the
Ohio-Kentucky border, Woodford County in the middle of the state,
and Wayne County on the border between Kentucky and Tennessee.
Located opposite Cincinnati, Ohio, on the banks of the Ohio River,
Boone County, Kentucky, was created in 1798 and named for
frontiersman Daniel Boone, who allegedly was the first white person to
establish a permanent settlement in the region.24 The county's Ohio
River location both spurred its settlement and promoted its expansion.
Boats on the Ohio River carried crops like corn and oats from Boone
County's fertile soil to the rest of the nation, which sustained the
county's population and generated great wealth for some.25 As an
indication of the relative prosperity of the county by the mid-nineteenth
century, the price for an acre of land had risen to $14.39 by 1846, which
was almost three times greater than the state average of slightly more
than $5.00 per acre.26
Denominated as the "Asparagus Bed of Kentucky," the area that
would become Woodford County was settled by emigrants from eastern
states due to its location near the Kentucky River, which provided a
means to export products to the rest of the country.27 The county's
vegetative moniker derived from the quality of the soil in the area that
supported the cultivation of hemp, tobacco, corn, and wheat while also
providing a substrate for the growth of high quality timber.28 The value
of Woodford County's taxable land in 1846 was approximately
$6,000.00 and the average value of an acre of land equaled $32.58,29
22 See LEWIS COLLINS, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF KENTUCKY: EMBRACING ITS HISTORY,
ANTIQUITIES, AND NATURAL CURIOSITIES, GEOGRAPHICAL, STATISTICAL, AND GEOLOGICAL
DESCRIPTIONS 552-53 (1850).
23 See id. at 179 (stating that Boone County was formed in 1798); id. at 548 (stating
that Wayne County was formed in 1800). Kentucky became a state in 1792. See id. at xv.
24 See id. at 181-82.
25 See id. at 179-80; see also ANN LUTES, A BRIEF HISTORY OF BOONE COUNTY,
KENTUCKY 2-4, 11 (1958).
26 See COLLINS, supra note 22, at 179.
27 RAILEY, supra note 21, at 5; see also COLLINS, supra note 22, at 553-54.
Presumably, asparagus was also grown, but Collins does not include it on the list of
crops grown on the area's farms.
28 See COLLINS, supra note 22, at 553.
29 See id.
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which serves as evidence of the quality of the area's farming and timber
interests. Recognizing the utility and profitability of the timber,
Woodford County residents eventually felled a significant portion of the
area's forested lands to the point that the quantity and quality of the
wooded lands became a memory.30
The southernmost county sampled in this study is Wayne County,
which was created in 1800 near the Cumberland River. In comparison
to the other two counties in this study, the price for an acre of land was
cheap at $3.02 per acre.31 The reason for the difference, presumably, is
that the surface of the land was "broken with hills."32 As evidence of the
topography's effect on industry, the primary exports of the county were
not items like corn or oats, but instead livestock, such as cattle, hogs,
or mules.33 Although the land may not have been as conducive for
farming compared to other areas of the state, individuals could mine a
"seam of coal upwards of thirty miles in length."34 Furthermore, iron
ore and saltwater could be extracted from the county's lands.35
Interestingly, Wayne County claims to have been the site of the first oil
strike in 1817.36 After a stream of oil made its way to the nearby river
and caught fire, however, "the well was stopped up to prevent the
nuisance."37
To study wills in Boone, Woodford, and Wayne Counties, this study
employed the data acquisition techniques of prior empirical
investigations of probate courts in other locations.38 Information from
available wills and inventories documented in probate books from
Boone, Woodford, and Wayne Counties between January 1, 1860 and
December 31, 1869 was extracted and coded for analysis. A possibility
30 See RAILEY, supra note 21, at 7.





36 See AUGUSTA PHILLIPS JOHNSON, A CENTURY OF WAYNE COUNTY, KENTUCKY, 1800-
1900, ch. IV (1939), available at http://genealogytrails.com/ken/wayne/chapter_4.html
[https://perma.cc/X86U-M578].
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy & Douglas Thie, Land, Slaves, and Bonds: Trust and
Probate in the Pre-Civil War Shenandoah Valley, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 345, 370-73 (2016)
("After we identified the 128 usable wills probated [in Rockbridge County, Virginia],
we coded each will for testator's and beneficiaries' gender and relationship; preference
between heirs; incidence, sophistication, and purpose of trusts; incidence of bequests
of and emancipation of slaves; and other peculiar provisions."); Stephen Duane Davis II
& Alfred L. Brophy, "The Most Solemn Act of My Life": Family, Property, Will, and Trust
in the Antebellum South, 62 ALA. L. REV. 757, 774-75 (2011).
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exists that some wills from the sample period are excluded from the data
set for various reasons. For example, a will probated in 1869 might not
make its way into the will book until mid-1870 due to a clerical error,
which is beyond the end of the sampling period.39 Although the total
number of wills sampled in this study is similar to that of prior studies
of similarly populated locations, the claim that every will from the
decade is included in this sample cannot be made.
Specifically, the data recorded from sampled wills includes the
following:
* Gender of testator
* The testator's ability to write as indicated by the signature on the
will (a signature or an "X" with a notation that the "X"
represented the testator's mark)
* Whether or not the testator provided for a spouse under the
express terms of a will
* Specific dispositions of the testator's real and personal property
- all property to a surviving spouse, divided among children, etc.
* Specific identification of slaves distributed under the terms of
wills
* Manumission provisions in wills
* Review of inventories to determine monetary value of slaves
* Conditions associated with the distributed property
* Creation of an explicit trust and the terms of the trust
* Beneficiary of remainder of estate
* The number of executors appointed and the relationship of the
chosen executors to the testator
* Terms of a codicil to testator's will40
39 Furthermore, a will may not have been indexed properly, which would make it
difficult to locate without leafing through each page of the relevant Will Book. In effect,
such a will is lost.
40 Although information for each datum was recorded from the wills during the
sample, the results and analysis portion of the paper do not include a discussion of each
type of data. Furthermore, a data point could not be recorded from each will because of
illegible handwriting or damage to the will that obscured information. In addition,
2441
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In total, this study evaluated 209 wills with eighty-two of those wills
from Boone County, eighty-five from Woodford County, and forty-two
from Wayne County. The wills from Boone County were recorded in
Will Records books H, I, K that span the years 1851-1873.41 The
sampled wills from Woodford County are recorded in Will Records
books P, Q, R, S, and T that include wills from 1854-1870. Wayne
County's sampled wills are contained in Will Records Book A that lists
wills from 1836-1909. While the sampled wills may have been executed
at any time before or during the sample period, the data used for
evaluation was extracted from wills probated during the between the
first day of 1860 and the last day of 1869.42 A will executed in 1845 and
probated in 1865 would be included in the sample while that same will
would be excluded from the sample if probated in mid-1870.
II. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
With a few exceptions, such as opening with the phrase "In the Name
of God Amen!!!",43 the wills in this sample were constructed in much
the same way as modern wills. The introductory clause established the
identity of a testator, specified the domicile of the testator, and eclared
that the testator was of sound mind.44 After the traditional introduction,
most testators desired that their "just debts" be paid and then provided
for specific, general, and residuary gifts that varied in drafting skill.
While the reasons for making distributional decisions went with most
testators to their graves, some offered explanations for the gifts made in
their wills that likely stung the targeted individuals. In his 1863 Wayne
interpretation of the language required some latitude in coding. Wills that employed
language that made gifts of property with directions to a third party regarding usage of
that property were coded as "trusts." A testator did not have to use the word "trust" to
create a trust, but intent was difficult to discern in some cases.
41 Will Record H begins in 1861 and its immediate predecessor, Will Record F, ends
in 1856. As a result, wills from 1860 were unavailable for sampling.
42 After visiting several county courthouses and libraries, a court clerk informed me
that wills books from the period are not held in county courthouses. Instead, all original
probate books from the sample period are housed at the Kentucky Department of
Libraries and Archives in Frankfort, Kentucky. However, a microfilm reproduction of
the relevant will records can be examined on Family Search at familysearch.org under
the heading of Kentucky Probate Records and then selecting the records for each county
during the relevant time period.
43 Last Will and Testament of William Hodges, in BOONE COUNTY WILL RECORD H
1861-1896 (1862) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
44 See id. (reciting that "I William Hodges, of the County of Boone and State of
Kentucky, being of sound mind but of feeble health, feel that it is my duty to settle my
worldly affairs, do hereby make this my last will and Testament").
2442 [Vol. 53:2433
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County will, John Bell wanted to revoke a gift of two pieces of real
property that he had made to his two sons and daughter four years
earlier.45 After revoking the prior gift to his sons, Bell's will continued:
[M]y will is that my daughter Polly Ann Bell have all the lands
... which may be in my possession at the time of my death and
all my personal estate of every kind owned by me at my death
after paying my just debts and funeral expenses. Giving to my
two sons one dollar each the reason why I revoke the deed of
gift as to my two sons they have wholly failed to comply with
their promise to make provisions for my support in my old
age.46
Although the law of gifts may have prevented the revocation of a
completed gift, Bell's will would likely be admissible in a probate court
today. Indeed, most of the wills in this sample would be admitted to
probate today.
A. Gender and Marital Status of Testators
The time-honored tenet of testamentary freedom applied to men
throughout nineteenth century Kentucky regardless of marital status or
skin color so long as black men were not enslaved. To that end, one will
from this sample shows that the power to transfer wealth at death
applied broadly to those qualified to execute a will. In 1860, Woodford
County's Charles Clarkson wrote:
I Charles Clarkson (A free man of Colour) being of sound mind
and memory, do make and constitute this my last will and
testament in matter and form as follows to wit ....
At my death I want my House and Lot of land on which I live
to be sold and the proceeds . . . divided between my children
47
After making general monetary gifts derived from the sale of his home
to two sons, two daughters, and the children of a predeceased
daughter,48 Charles Clarkson affixed his signature to his will. Clarkson
did not know how to write his name; therefore, he signed his will with
4 See Last Will and Testament ofJohn Bell, in WAYNE COUNTY WILL RECORD A 1836-
1909, at 189 (1868) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
46 Id.
47 Last Will and Testament of Charles Clarkson, in BOONE COUNTy WILL RECORDS G
1855-1862, at 508 (1861) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
48 See id.
2443
University of California, Davis
an "X" and someone placed a notation near the "X" that it represented
"his mark."4 9 Five months later, Clarkson executed a codicil that stated:
Whereas having received information that my son Samuel is
dead I will and devise that one hundred dollars be paid to his
children after deducting the balance due on a note given to John
Tompkins by him on which R. L. Bristow is security and which
said R. L. Bristow has paid.50
Thereafter, Charles Clarkson again signed his name with an "X" and the
Woodford County probate court subsequently accepted both
instruments in 1861.51 Clarkson, "a free man of Colour," exercised his
testamentary authority over the property he owned at death - twice.
In contrast to the testamentary freedom afforded men, women were
largely barred from exercising testamentary authority for the first half
of the nineteenth century by a historical mix of statutory and common
law barriers. In fact, most married women in the United States did not
have statutory power to exercise testamentary freedom by making a will
until the mid-nineteenth century or thereafter.52 And some of those
"progressive" statutes mirrored common law by only permitting a wife
to execute a will with her husband's consent.53 Nevertheless, numerous
jurisdictions enacted statutory reforms providing wives with the power
to dispose of property by will during the latter half of the nineteenth
century.54
For its part, Kentucky proved to be a rather late subscriber to the
statutory reforms regarding the testamentary authority of wives. The
individuals who possessed the legal capacity to make a valid will under
the provisions of the 1852 Revised Statutes of Kentucky included:
[e]very person of sound mind, not being under twenty-one




52 See Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. LJ.
1359, 1366 (1982).
53 See, e.g. 1842 Md. Laws (1843) ch. 294 § 6 ("That a wife shall have a right to
make a will and give all her property or any part thereof to her husband, and other
persons with the consent of the husband subscribed to said will . . . "); 1833 Pa. Laws
249 ("That a married woman may, under a power legally created for the purpose,
dispose of her real or personal estate by will or appointment, in nature of a will, and
that any married woman may, with the assent or license of her husband, dispose of her
personal estate by will.").
54 See Chused, supra note 52, at 1366 n.27.
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estate, right, or interest in real or personal estate that he may be
entitled to at his death, which would otherwise descend to his
heirs or pass to his personal representative; and though he may
become so entitled after the execution of his will.55
Importantly, this exact statutory language remained on the pages of
Kentucky statutory codes during the period of this sample,56 which
means that statutory law prohibited the married women in this sample
from making a will. Table 1 shows the frequency of wills by testator's
gender in the wills books of Boone, Woodford, and Wayne Counties
during the sample period.
Table 1. Frequency of Wills by Gender in Boone, Woodford, and Wayne
Counties 1860-187057




The difference in testation by gender reported in Table 1 favorably
compares with the results of prior empirical efforts.58 Kentucky's statute
defining who had the legal capacity to execute a will undoubtedly
eliminated a significant percentage of potential female testators in this
sample. However, a similar result would likely have been obtained even
if Kentucky statutory law had provided married women with the legal
capacity to make wills. The common law of coverture would, in all
likelihood, have left married women with little property to transfer at
death59 According to the law of coverture, marriage transformed a
55 C.A. WICKLIFFE ET AL., REVISED STATUTES OF KENTUCKY ch. CVI, § 2, at 693-94
(1852) (emphasis added).
56 See, e.g. Rev. Stats. of Kentucky ch. 106 § 2 (1860); Gen. Stats. Kentucky ch. 113
§ 2 (1873); Gen. Stats. Kentucky ch. 113 § 2 (1879); Gen. Stats. Kentucky ch. 113, § 2
(1887).
57 All sampled wills are included in the results displayed in Table 1.
58 See, e.g., Brophy & Thie, supra note 38, at 372-73 (finding that 70.9% of sixty-
one wills probated between 1850 and 1861 in Rockbridge County, Virginia were written
by men); Chused, supra note 52, at 1372 tbl.2 (noting that 78% of wills probated
between 1841 and 1850 in Dukes County, Massachusetts were written by men); Davis
II & Brophy, supra note 38, at 775 (reporting that 86.1% of testators from 1841 to 1845
in Greene County, Alabama, were men).
59 An additional reason for the testation difference by gender is that the wills of
husband testators frequently included gift-overs in gifts to surviving wives, which
would again deprive surviving wives of property to transfer by will. For the structure of
husband testators' gifts to surviving wives, see infra Part II.B.
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single woman, a feme sole, into a married woman, a feme covert, and
stripped her of almost all of her rights to own and manage property.60
A woman lost the authority to manage any real property she owned once
she married; the married woman's husband gained the right to deal with
land as he saw fit and his wife had little to no legal power to alter
whatever course of action he chose.61 And, a married woman also lost
ownership of her personal property to her husband upon marriage
under the law of coverture.62 Given the loss of legal rights over real and
personal property, most married women probably had little property to
distribute by will or intestate succession.
Although Kentucky courts maintained that "the general rule is, that a
married woman can not make a will," 63 the common law and statutory
obstacles to testation by wives did not establish impenetrable barriers
during the sample period. To the contrary, a wife's authority to execute
a valid will expanded throughout the nineteenth century in the state's
courts. In In re Yates' Will, the Court of Appeals in Kentucky eroded the
barrier to testation by recognizing that "[t]here are well established
exceptions to the general rule, that a feme covert can not make a will." 64
The court continued that:
[w]here she is an executrix, she can make a will, so far as to
appoint an executor, for the purpose of thereby transmitting an
executorial trust. She can make a will in pursuance of an
agreement with her husband before marriage; or in fulfilment
of a power of appointment, reserved by herself, or delegated to
her by another . . . .65
Furthermore, Kentucky courts later recognized that a married woman
had the power to execute a will to dispose of personal property at death
with the consent of her husband.66 To fall within the exception, a wife
would have to show that her husband waived the interest in her
personal property accruing to him under coverture thereby granting
testamentary authority over that property to his wife.67
60 See Chused, supra note 52, at 1367-68.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 1367.
63 See In re Yates' Will, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 215, 217 (1834); Anderson v. Miller, 29 Ky.
(6 Jj. Marsh.) 568, 574 (1831) (observing that the "[w]ill of a feme covert is void").
64 In re Yates' Will, 32 Ky. at 216.
65 Id.
66 See George v. Bussing, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 558, 563 (1855).
67 See id.
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In addition to the common law exceptions to the ban on testation,
Kentucky's legislature enacted statutes that broadened testamentary
power of married women in the state. For example, a married woman
in this sample could have executed a valid will pursuant to a statute that
recognized a wife's testamentary authority over "any estate secured to
her separate use by deed or devise, or in the exercise of a special power
to that effect."68 Furthermore, the General Assembly added a section to
its code in 1865 that provided a married woman with the authority to
make a will "on the joint petition of husband and wife" filed in the
appropriate court.69 Despite the availability of common law and
statutory exceptions in Kentucky, Table 2 illustrates that almost none
of the married women in Boone, Woodford, and Wayne Counties relied
upon them to execute wills.70
Table 2. Marital Status of Testators in Boone, Woodford, and Wayne
Counties 1860-187071
County Total Married Male Married Female
Testators Married
Boone 44 44 0
Woodford 28 27 1
Wayne 40 40 0
68 STANTON, supra note 12, at 457.
69 See 1866 Ky. Acts 36.
70 For purposes of this study, marital status was determined by mention of a spouse
within the terms of the will. The marital status of an individual testator is difficult to
determine without consulting marriage, divorce, and death records in conjunction with
the probate record. A will could, for example, mention a spouse, but that spouse could
have predeceased the testator or divorced the testator and a testator may fail to update
a will to account for the changed circumstances. As a result, a testator's will would
indicate presence of a current spouse, but the testator was not, in fact, married at the
time of probate. The relative absence of married female testators is consistent with other
empirical studies of probate records. See, e.g., Davis II & Brophy, supra note 38, at 777
(reporting that "[a]mong those who had spouses, all the testators were male" in Greene
County, Alabama, during two sample periods).
71 All sampled wills were evaluated to compile the data in Table 2. The one
exception in Woodford County involved a married woman whose will did not seem to
transfer any property in Kentucky. All of the property devised under her will was located
in Iowa. The record contains no explanation as to how or why her will was admitted to
probate.
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In lieu of invoking a common law or statutory exception to make a
will, some wives in Kentucky gained legislative permission to execute a
will in the form of a private bill that allowed a specific wife to transfer
her property by will. On March 21, 1851, for example, Kentucky's
General Assembly passed a bill entitled "AN ACT for the benefit of
Elizabeth C. Flourney, of McCracken County" with the following
provisions:
§1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, That Elizabeth C. Flournoy, wife of L. M. Flournoy,
of McCracken County, be and she is hereby authorized and
empowered to make her last will and testament, which shall be
as valid, and of as full force, in law, as if she were a feme sole;
and all devises and bequests made by her in such will, if made
by her while a feme covert, shall pass the title as fully and
perfectly as if she were an unmarried woman at the time of
making such will: Provided, said will shall be made, during the
life of her present husband, L. M. Flournoy.
§2. That the property hereby authorized to be devised, under
this act, by the said Elizabeth C. Flournoy, is confined to the
property that belonged to her before her marriage with her
present husband.72
Although Mrs. Flournoy's private bill granted her the ability to make a
will, the legislation did not grant her unfettered testamentary uthority.
Instead, the bill's language limited her testamentary power to the
duration of her husband's life and only extended to the property she
owned prior to marriage. Given the transaction costs of obtaining a
private bill, Mrs. Flournoy had, in all likelihood, a significant pre-
marital estate to transfer at death.
The legislation that specifically benefitted Elizabeth Flournoy is one
of a number of private bills that addressed the ban on testation for
married women during the nineteenth century. Prior to 1848, however,
only one private bill provided testamentary authority to a married
woman like the express testamentary power granted to Elizabeth
Flournoy. The overwhelming majority of pre-1848 private bills enacted
by the legislature granted divorces to married women whose husbands
had violated the marital contract to a sufficient degree to justify a
72 An Act for the Benefit of Elizabeth C. Flourney, of McCracken County, 1851 Ky.
Acts 461.
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legislative divorce.73John Lyon, for instance, "became an abandoned sot
and vagabond, abusing and greatly maltreating" his wife; therefore, the
legislature concluded that Nancy Lyon was entitled to a divorce from
John.74 With the exception of private bills for divorce, few pre-1848
enactments addressed the rights of married women and those that did
fell short of increasing property or testamentary rights.
After 1848, Kentucky's General Assembly entertained an increasing
number of bills that broadened testamentary power as well as the
economic opportunities for the state's married women. A few private
bills expressly granted testamentary authority to a specific married
woman in much the same manner as Elizabeth Flournoy's private bill.75
More commonly, however, the legislature authorized a married woman
to act as a feme sole. In spring 1865, the General Assembly passed "An
ACT for the benefit of Mary Ann Ford" that provided:
That Mary Ann Ford, of Garrard County, be relieved of all
disabilities of coverture in regard to any property she may now
be entitled to by inheritance or otherwise, or which she may
hereafter acquire, and contracts she may hereafter make; all
such property, either in right of inheritance or acquisition
aforesaid, shall be exempt from all liabilities or disposition of
her husband; and she is here invested with all powers of a feme
sole.76
Unlike Elizabeth Flournoy's bill, the primary aim of Mary Ford's bill
may have been to permit her to conduct business or engage in
transactions involving property acquired after passage of the bill." Mary
Ford, however, also received "all powers of a feme sole" and was
"relieved of all disabilities of coverture." Because one of the "powers" of
being a single woman was the ability to execute a will, a possibility
exists that Mary Ford could have made a will to distribute property that
she owned or acquired as a result of the removal of "all disabilities of
coverture."
73 See, e.g., 1828 Ky. Acts 233. This act is rather unusual because it includes three
divorces in one enactment and includes one that favored the husband, who was
"restored to all the privileges of an unmarried man." Id. Nevertheless, most divorces
were granted in favor of wives.
74 1839 Ky. Acts 373.
75 See, e.g., An Act for the Benefit of Sarah S. Fowler, of Livingston County, 1849 Ky.
Acts 96; An Act for the Benefit of Ellen D. Nicholas, 1849 Ky. Acts 104.
76 An Act for the Benefit of Mary Ann Ford, 1865 Ky. Acts 394.
77 The benefit of permitting individuals like Mary Ford to conduct business might
primarily accrue to men because of the strictures of coverture.
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In total, twenty married women obtained private legislation that
authorized them to engage in economic activities reserved to afeme sole
after 1848.78 The raw number of private bills that expressly conferred
testamentary authority or feme sole status on a specific married woman
may not be eye-popping, but the number of such bills is noteworthy
given their almost total absence prior to 1848. To that end, the increased
number of private bills post-1848 represents a step on the continuum
of property rights that led to full economic and testamentary agency for
married women. Adding further momentum toward unencumbered
individual autonomy for married women, the legislature also enacted
public laws that recognized the capacity of married women to make
valid wills under some circumstances, such as when a husband had
abandoned his wife.79 In combination, private bills authorizing will-
making as well as public laws that sanctioned economic opportunities
for married women occupied an expanded amount of space on the post-
1848 legislative agenda, particularly when compared to their relative
pre-1848 absence.
The increased number of bills concerned with issues involving
married women after 1848 may not be a coincidence as the summer of
1848 witnessed the historic launch of the women's rights movement at
Seneca Falls, New York.80 While the elective franchise occupied the
forefront of attendees' minds, the Declaration of Sentiments, Grievances,
and Resolutions asserted that men have made women "if married, in the
eye of the law, civilly dead" and that "[h] e has taken from her all right
in property, even to the wages she earns."81 Given the timing, the post-
1848 legislation in Kentucky may reflect a legal shift toward increased
economic opportunities for women, which led to increased property
ownership and, ultimately, to the expectation that such property could
be transferred at death. In that sense, post-1848 legislation represents
the roots of Kentucky's incremental march toward testamentary
78 See, e.g., An Act for the Benefit of Klara Dinkelspiel, 1865 Ky. Acts 339; An Act
for the benefit of Louise Friedman of Louisville, 1863 Ky. Acts 545.
79 See Kentucky General Assembly, Law of Kentucky 338, An Act Authorizing
Permanent Provision for Resident Families in Kentucky Stocks, and Guardians to Invest
the Money of their Wards in Bank Stocks, ch. 955 (1837); Kentucky General Assembly,
Law of Kentucky 140, An Act for the Divorce of Silas and Elizabeth Hedges, ch. 72
(1842).
so See Sherry H. Penney & James D. Livingston, Expectant at Seneca Falls, 84 N.Y.
HIST. 32 (2003).
81 Declaration of Sentiments, NAT'L PARK SERv., https://www.nps.gov/wori/learn/
historyculture/declaration-of-sentiments.htm (last updated Feb. 26, 2015) [https://perma.
cc/GAP7-D9AZ].
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equality for women regardless of marital status that ended in 1894 with
the passage of statute authorizing testation by married women.82
B. Distributions of Non-Human Property
The primary purpose of a will, of course, is to transfer property at
death and the wills in this sample display the full spectrum of
complexity. Some testators executed lengthy wills that created
complicated property arrangements following their deaths. The sixth
clause of John Parker's sixteen-clause Woodford County will specified:
I give to my wife Mary Parker my home farm to live on her
lifetime, if she desire it, if she does not accept the farm it is to
be sold with the balance of my estate both real and personal and
mixed, my slaves burying ground and specific gifts excepted -
and my wife have absolutely one half of the proceeds of the sale
I direct that should the land not bring eighteen dollars per acre
at the first offering at Public Sale that my Executor or
Administrator rent out the land from year to year until it does
bring that amount and to hire out the following slaves until such
sale of land is made, Morgan, Andrew, William, James, Daniel,
Adaline Lewis, and provisions made for their leaving the state
according to provisions hereinafter made.83
Woodford County's William R. Gilmer's one sentence will, on the other
hand, stated that he intended to "will and bequeath to my wife Sallie
Gilmer all of my estate of every description after payment of my debts
except a gray horse which I will to my Father Bernard Gilmer." 84
Regardless of the complexity of the plan, testators generally sought to
leave property to family members, particularly surviving wives if they
were married at the time of will execution. The following table, Table
3, shows the frequency of wills designating wives as the primary takers
as well as the frequency with which those wills included conditions on
the use of property received under those wills.
82 See KY. STAT. ch. 66 § 2147 (1894) (stating that "[a] married woman, if she be of
sound mind and twenty-one years of age, may dispose of her estate, by last will and
testament, subject to the provisions of this act").
83 Last Will and Testament ofJohn Parker, in WOODFORD COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK
Q 1854-1861 571 (1861) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
84 Last Will and Testament of William R. Gilmer, in WOODFORD COUNTY WILL RECORD
BOOK R 1861-1867, at 121 (1862) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
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Table 3. Percentage of Wills Designating Wives as Primary Takers in
Wills from Boone, Woodford, and Wayne County 1860-187085
With Without
County All Wills (%)t thu
Condition (%) Condition (%)
Boone 42.0 79.4 20.6
Woodford 34.1 69.0 31.0
Wayne 51.2 85.7 14.3
Avg. 42.4 78.0 26.7
The results of Table 3 show that the structure of testamentary gifts
made under the terms of husbands' wills often restricted the property
rights of their surviving wives. The most common restriction in sampled
wills was to limit the property rights of a surviving wife to the duration
of her life. In his 1867 Boone County will, Benjamin Sandford stated:
I give devise and bequeath all my real and personal property of
every description to my beloved wife Elizabeth Sandford for and
during her natural life and after her death all my estate to be
equally divided among all my children.86
Other Boone County testators, like John White, added an additional
durational limit on the rights of a surviving spouse. White's 1864 will
specified that:
I give devise and bequeath unto my beloved wife Minerva White
for and during the term and period of her natural life all my
estate real personal and mixed provided she remains my widow
and in the event of her intermarriage she is to have one third
portion of the same, my said wife is authorized to sell and
dispose of any part or all of my personal estate and dispose of
the proceeds in any manner she may think proper or see fit.
The estate remaining after the death of my said wife to be
equally divided amongst my children or their bodily heirs.8 7
Regardless of the number of restrictions on the gifts, the primary goal
of these testators was to support their surviving wives.
85 All sampled wills were evaluated to compile the results in Table 3. The category
"With Conditions" was calculated by dividing the number of wills that identified a wife
as a primary taker by the number of wills that attached conditions to the gift. The same
process applied to the category "Without Conditions."
86 Last Will and Testament of Benjamin Sandford, in BOONE COUNTY WILL RECORD
BOOK 11866-1870, at 293 (1867) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
87 Last Will and Testament of John White, in BOONE COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK I
1866-1870, supra note 86, at 214-15.
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The language used to create the restricted gifts in wills like those of
Sandford and White suggests that the surviving wives took life estates
in their decedent husbands' property. As further evidence of the
restricted nature of the gifts, husband testators typically made gift-overs
of the property transferred to their surviving wives. As a result,
surviving wives would not have the property they received from their
decedent husbands' estate to transfer by will even if they remained
unmarried for the rest of their lives; the disposition of that property was
controlled by their husbands' wills. Combining the strictures of
coverture with the structure of gifts made under husbands' wills,
widowed women in this nineteenth century sample had little incentive
to execute wills because of a lack of property/wealth, which is oft-cited
as a factor that explains the low frequency of will-making today.8 8
In contrast to testators who limited the property rights of their
surviving spouses, some husbands transferred all of their property to
their surviving wives without any conditions whatsoever. Joel Gray's
Woodford County will used the language of possessory estates in his
unrestricted gift with the declaration that:
After my debts are paid the balance of my estate is to be divided
equally between my wife Mary P. Gray and my daughter Mary
H Gray. This division is intended to embrace all the estate I have
of every kind and description. If my daughter should die
without a child or children living at the time of her death then
the estate devised to her is to vest in my wife in fee simple.8 9
Similarly, Charles Buster executed a will that provided:
To my dearly beloved wife Mary E. Buster I will and bequeath
all the property hereinafter mentioned in this (second)
paragraph to have and hold during her natural life and then to
dispose of by will or otherwise as she may deem proper.9 0
Buster's will may have limited Mary's interest to the duration of her life,
but authorizing Mary to dispose of the property by will suggests that
88 See, e.g., Barbranda Lumpkins Walls, Haven't Done a Will Yet?, AARP (Feb. 24,
2017), https://www.aarp.org/money/investing/info-2017/half-of-adults-do-not-have-
wills.html [https://perma.cc/44PZ-FDBX] (noting that the results of a study showed that
twenty-nine percent of respondents in one survey stated that they "don't have enough
assets to leave to anyone").
89 Last Will and Testament ofjoel Gray, in WOODFORD COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK S
1861-1867, at 81 (1864) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
90 Last Will and Testament of Charles Buster, in WAYNE COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK
A 1836-1909, at 187 (1868) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
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Charles intended her to take what amounted to fee simple in his
property following his death. And, Buster's will did not make a gift-over
of whatever portion of the gifted property remained in Mary's
possession at her death, which reinforces the notion that Buster
intended to transfer unencumbered control of his property to Mary at
his death.
If married testators failed to make their surviving wives the primary
objects of their post-mortem gifts with or without conditions, then they
typically gave their property to their children. In most such cases, the
likely reason for giving property to children and not a surviving spouse
is that the spouse had predeceased the testator. In any event, the
following two tables, Tables 4 and 5, show the frequency with which
sons and daughters obtained either all property or a share in real or
personal property from a testator's will.
Table 4. Percentage of Wills Giving Sons All Property, an Interest in
Real Property, and/or an Interest in Personal Property in Wills from
Boone, Woodford, and Wayne County 1860-187091





Boone 16.0 20.1 27.2
Woodford 22.4 16.5 29.4
Wayne 39.0 26.8 12.2
Avg. 25.8 21.1 22.9
91 All sampled wills were included for the tabulation in Table 4.
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Table 5. Percentage of Wills Giving Daughters All Property, an Interest
in Real Property, and/or an Interest in Personal Property in Wills from
Boone, Woodford, and Wayne County 1860-187092
County All Property Real Personal
Property (%) Property (%)
Boone 19.8 21.0 24.7
Woodford 22.3 15.3 27.1
Wayne 36.6 17.1 14.6
Avg. 26.2 17.8 22.1
Although Tables 4 and 5 reveal a rough equivalence regarding the
preferences for sons or daughters among sampled testators, the
language of a handful of the gifts to daughters attempted to impose a
condition that had no equivalent in the gifting language to sons. In her
Wayne County will, Nancy McDaniel emphasized:
My will is that what land or real & personal estate which is
willed and bequeathed to Rachel Wright, the wife of William
Wright shall vest in fee simple to her & her heirs forever so as
never to be taken from her (the said Rachel Wright) to pay any
of the said William Wright's debts now or hereafter contracted
unless the said Rachel Wright give freely and willingly by her
consent for it to be did [sic]. And for fear that this my last will
and testament would not be considered in the light in which I
desire it to be considered, I have been this explicit in this this,
the last part of it as it regards Rachel Wright, the wife of William
Wright, one of my executors.93
Nancy's intent to preserve her estate for the benefit of Rachel would
have been, in all likelihood, difficult to enforce. Nevertheless, Nancy's
language unambiguously demonstrates that she was concerned about
Rachel's well-being and sought to shield Rachel's gifts from dissipation
by William Wright.
Rather than make outright gifts of property at death, some testators
created testamentary trusts to transfer wealth and maintain a measure
92 All sampled wills were included for the tabulation in Table 5.
93 Last Will and Testament of Nancy McDaniel, in WAYNE COUNTY WILL RECORDS
BOOK A 1836-1909, at 163 (1862) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
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of control over the property from beyond the grave. The following table
displays the percentages of sampled wills that created express trusts
within the four corners of the instruments.
Table 6. Percentage of Wills with Testamentary Trusts in Boone,
Woodford, and Wayne Counties 1860-187094




While the trusts in this sample often benefitted children or
grandchildren, a few testators/settlors created trusts with a less
optimistic purposes - preventing property from being used to pay a
beneficiary's debts. After making a testamentary gift to his wife, William
S. Buford established a plan for the remainder of his estate that required
that:
[T]he remainder shall be divided amongst my six children
Charles Buford, William R. Buford, Kate Buford, Mark Buford,
Maggie Buford & Mary Duke Buford, it being specially provided
that the portion of my estate thus bequeathed to Charles Buford
shall be held in trust by my Executors who are hereby appointed
trustees for this purpose till all debts which he shall heretofore
have contracted or for which he may now be liable shall have
been paid or satisfactorily arranged.9 5
Interestingly, spendthrift trusts created by the express language of the
wills were singularly created for the benefit of sons - not daughters.
Although they lacked the prohibitions of spendthrift trusts, the
express testamentary trusts created for the benefit of daughters imposed
a different type of restraint on alienation. The third clause of Wayne
County's James West's will provided that:
The portion of my estate herein devised to my daughter Mary
Margaret Anna Buster is to vest in L. A. Lanier who is hereby
created a Trustee to hold the Title to the estate and property
94 All sampled wills are included in the tabulation in Table 6.
95 Last Will and Testament of William S. Buford, in WOODFORD COUNTY WILL RECORDS
BOOK T 1867-1870, at 98 (1862) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
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devised to her in trust, for her sole & separate use and the use
of such children as she may now have or may hereafter have and
at her death the trust is to cease and her share is to pass to her
children if she have any living at her death, but if any of her
children should die before she dies, then the child or children
of such dead child shall take the same part the parent would
have taken if living at my daughter's death.
The portion of my estate given to Mary Margaret Anne Buster is
not be under the control of her present husband or any husband
she may hereafter have but is to be free from the control of any
husband she may have at any time.96
The restrictions on use by Mary's husband took direct aim at the law of
coverture's retitling of property upon a woman's marriage as West not
only sought to protect assets for the benefit of his daughter in the
present, but also his descendants in the future.
Testators like James West commonly used the phrase "sole & separate
use" in testamentary transfers intended to confer a benefit on their
daughters and did so with the knowledge of legal consequences of that
phrase. The phrase "sole & separate use" indicated that the testator
intended to create a separate use trust of the assets to be used solely by
the beneficiary and not available for consumption by a husband or
creditor.97 By creating a separate use trust, father testators sought to
avoid the property rights sacrificed upon marriage by their daughters as
a result of coverture.98 Creating a testamentary separate use trust
circumvented coverture by splitting legal and equitable title between a
trustee and a married woman. Coverture transferred a married woman's
property that she owned outright to her husband at marriage, but she
did not own separate use trust assets outright; therefore, common law
coverture did not apply.99 Given its goal of providing assets for the
singular use of a married woman, the separate state offered a married
woman some measure of economic agency amidst a legal framework in
which she was "civilly dead" in many, if not most, situations.
While the separate use trust seemingly advanced married women's
property rights, the link between the separate use trust and the
promotion of married women's property rights is not without scholarly
96 Last Will and Testament ofjames West, in WAYNE COUNTY WILL RECORDS BOOK A
1836-1909, at 155 (1862) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
97 Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the
Married Woman's Separate Estate, 26 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 165, 173 (2014).
98 See id. at 167.
99 See id.
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criticism. The bifurcation of title inherent in any trust forms the
foundation of one basic criticism. A trustee holds legal title to separate
use trust assets and can manage those assets as deemed prudent while
the equitable title possessed by the married woman beneficiary, on the
other hand, lacks decision-making authority over trust assets. Because
of the difference in agency over trust assets, critics argue that the
separate use trust did not promote married women's property rights but
instead highlighted the limitations on those rights.100 As a practical
matter, one may only guess what happened to any property actually
distributed from the trust to a married woman; testamentary restrictions
settling separate use trusts may have been little more than paper
barriers.
More fundamentally, historians maintain that the underlying goal of
the separate use trust was not to broaden a married woman's autonomy,
but rather to retain property within a family line by allocating some
property to a daughter while transferring most of the property to a
son.101 Transferring property to sons increased the probability that
accumulated wealth would remain within the family because sons
benefitted from coverture while daughters lost property because of
coverture.102 To that end, the language of many separate use trusts
suggests that the intent of the transferors was not to push the limits of
married women's property rights but rather to serve as a protective
measure. Numerous separate use trusts directed that assets are to be
"free from the control of any husband," which preserves assets for
future descendants by prohibiting a husband's transfer of trust assets to
individuals or creditors outside of that family. 103 As a result, any
advancement of married women's property rights associated with
separate use trusts is ancillary to their primary function of insulating
and transferring wealth down a bloodline.
Separate use trusts may have fallen short of unfettered promotion of
married women's autonomy, but the absence of unfettered promotion
is not the equivalent of the absence of any promotion. Whatever
limitations accompanied the split of legal and equitable title, separate
100 See Susan Moller Okin, Patriarchy and Married Women's Property in England:
Questions on Some Current Views, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 121, 124-25 (1983-
1984).
101 See SUSAN STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN'S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN ENGLAND, 1660-1833,
at 221-22 (1990).
102 See id.
103 See Tait, supra note 97, at 204 (stating that "families were certainly motivated to
create these trusts as much to protect against a potentially irresponsible and spendthrift
son-in-law as to provision the daughter, as is clear from the standard language used in
creating the estate").
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use trusts signify an important step in the direction expanding a married
woman's agency. Married women who received benefits from separate
trusts could, for example, use those benefits to remove themselves from
difficult marriages because trust assets served as an independent means
of support or recover property from husbands by filing a claim against
him in court.104 Freeing assets from the control of a husband offered a
wife some measure of independence within a legal regime in which she
was "covered" by her husband.
Within the context of probate, property accrued as a result of an
equitable interest in trust could be transferred by a married woman in
her will - if an exception for testamentary transfer of a separate estate
was part of the common law in a given jurisdiction. And for the married
women in this sample, Kentucky's common and statutory law
recognized that a married woman could make a valid will "in
consequence of her proprietorship of a separate estate, her dominion or
right of alienation over which, is held to authorize her to dispose of it
by will." 105 While a married women could not enter into contracts, serve
as a plaintiff or defendant in court, or participate in the market for real
property,106 the ability to execute a will to dispose of property
constituting a separate estate gave married women a mechanism by
which to make distributional decisions regarding property that had the
sanction of law. Transferring a separate estate by will provided a
married woman with a legally valid mechanism to express her intent -
on paper.
C. Testamentary Distributions of Human Property - Slaves
The most significant difference between wills executed before and
after 1865 can be summed up in one word - slaves. Before 1865, an
owner's enslaved population often constituted the most financially
valuable asset in a slave-owning testator's estate other than land. In
1850, for example, an inventory of James Jones's Wayne County estate
included a number of personal items, livestock, bank notes, and three
slaves: Perry valued at $650.00, Toby worth $700.00, and one female,
Judy, estimated to be worth $200.00.107 Jones's executors estimated that
104 See id. at 178-90.
105 In re Yates' Will, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 215, 216 (1834); see STANTON, supra note 12,
at 457.
106 See Tait, supra note 97, at 167.
107 See WAYNE COUNTY BOOK OF APPRAISEMENTSAND INVENTORIES, 1852-1889, VOL. C
42-43 Film #004819944.
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the total value of his estate was a little less than $2,500.00,108 which
means that Jones's slaves constituted over one-half of the monetary
value of his estate.
The real property in this study's counties represented wealth that
could be transferred at the death of the landowner, but that total wealth
would not have been as great without enslaved people to work the land.
From the earliest time of each county, slaves cleared land of trees, rocks,
and brush and then either labored on new farms or in workshops to
generate wealth for their owners. One estimate suggests hat 70% of the
individuals who settled Woodford County brought slaves with them to
Kentucky.109 Interestingly, publicly available comments about the
treatment of slaves are haltingly positive. One description of slave life
in Woodford County, for example, reports that "the antebellum negro
in Woodford was a happy, well-fed, well treated slave."110 While such
descriptions are difficult to digest, few would disagree that the work of
slaves contributed to the settlement and survival of the communities in
each of the counties in this study. Table 7 below shows the percentage
of wills in each county with provisions that distributed slaves to new
owners.
108 See id.
109 See RAILEY, supra note 21, at 4.
110 Id. at 7.
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Table 7. Percentage of Wills in Boone, Woodford, and Wayne Counties
from 1860-1870 that Distributed Slaves or the Profits of Slave Sales"'1




The lower percentage of Boone County wills that allocated slaves to
new owners, as compared with the other two counties in this sample, is
likely the result of the general exodus of slaves from the area during the
period leading up to the Civil War. For the first half of the nineteenth
century, slaves consistently constituted somewhere near 20% of the
county's population.112 By the time of the 1860 Federal Census, the
population of slaves had decreased to 15% of the total population in the
county.113 During the ten years that transpired between 1860-1870,
nearly 50% of the county's enslaved population left the area.114 In fact,
the relocation of enslaved individuals out of Boone County during that
decade "represents one of the highest rates of out-migration in the
country during the Civil War decade of 1860-1870."115 Those enslaved
persons that remained in Boone County lived with the risk that they
would be among the 19.5% of Boone County wills that transferred
slaves to new owners.
The fear of separation from family and friends at the death of an
owner haunted the lives of slaves whether or not the owner made a will
that explicitly denominated a new owner. Woodford County's Verpile
Paine failed to make a will; therefore, his property passed by intestate
succession. After appointing appraisers to put dollar values on Paine's
property,116 the appraisers ubmitted an inventory for court approval on
111 All wills were included in the tabulation for Table 7.
112 See Margaret Warminski, African Americans in Boone County, Chronicles of Boone





116 See Inventory of Verpyle Paine, in WOODFORD COUNTY WILL RECORDS R 1861-1867
290-91 (1862) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
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November 17, 1862.117 Included among Paine's property are a group of
slaves among his personal estate:








































Phyllis & child 30 250






Martha 16 years old 150
Milly 13 Do 175
6 Shares Midway & Versailles
Turnpike Stock @ $20 per share 120
$3505.00118
And on Christmas Eve 1862, the appraisers submitted a list of buyers





































117 See id. at 291.
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While the appraisers' estimates of the values of Paine's slaves was off by
almost 50%, the monetary differential pales in comparison to the real-
world impact of Paine's death on the lives of his enslaved population.
The inventory lists "Ellen & Bob & children," but the list of sales
reports the sale of "Ellen & five children" without including Bob.120 Bob
may have died, run off with the hope that he would return, or sold.
Whatever happened, the odds that Bob remained with Ellen and the
children after Paine's death seem low, which likely would have had a
devastating effect on Ellen and the children. Beyond the impact on Bob,
Ellen, and the child/ren, Paine's death disrupted a coherent web of
connections within a specific enslaved community.
Instead of leaving the distribution of enslaved persons to the
operation of an intestate statute, the slave-owning testators in this
sample bequeathed their enslaved populations to new owners in three
basic ways. Because slaves were personal property under Kentucky law
during the sample period,121 a testator could make a generic gift of
"personal property" to transfer slaves to new owners.122 In his 1863
Boone County will, Absalom Gaines simply declared that " [i] t is my will
and intention that all of my real and personal property be divided
equally between my wife Fanny Gaines and my children according to
Law." 123 Gaines's will does not indicate that he owned any slaves at the
time of his death, but the inventory of his estate reveals that he did, in
fact, own slaves.124 At the time of his death, Gaines owned sixteen
people and each enslaved individual became the property of either
Fanny Gaines and Absalom's children after Gaines' death because of the
gift of personal property in Gaines's will. 125 Second, some slaveowners
identified their slaves by name in the testamentary clauses that
transferred them to new owners. Blending the first two approaches,
some slave-owning testators allocated specific slaves to specific takers
and left the rest to be distributed by a sweeping gift of personal property.
In his 1863 Boone County will, John Conner distributed Artemere,
Benjamin, Newton, John, and Bill to specific children and a daughter-
120 The list of sales includes a "Bob" as the second recorded sale, but that individual
seems likely to be the "Bob" who is the second slave listed on Paine's inventory,
especially because the list of slaves on the inventory and list of sales appears to identify
the individuals in the same order.
121 See WICKLIFFE ET AL., supra note 55, at 627.
122 See Warner's Ex'rs v. Swearingen, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 195, 197 (1838).
123 Last Will and Testament of Absalom Gaines, in BOONE COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK
H 1861-1866, at 167-68 (1863) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
124 See Inventory of Absalom Gaines Estate, in BOONE COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK H
1861-1866, supra note 123, at 250.
125 See id.
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in-law and then transferred "one third of the remainder of my blacks to
my wife Elizabeth Conner for and during her natural life." 126 The
inventory of Connor's estate showed that Roena, Perry, Cynthia, and
Mime were assets included in his personal estate;127 therefore, a portion
of those individuals belonged to Conner's widow following his death by
way of Conner's gift of his remainder. Regardless of the specificity with
which slaves were transferred, the following table shows who received
slaves from the testators in this sample.
Table 8. Percentages of Slaveowners' Wills that Allocated an Interest in
Slaves to Wives, Daughters, Sons, and Others in Boone, Woodford, and
Wayne Counties 1860-1870128
County Wife (%) Daughter (%) Son (%) Other (%)
Boone (16) 43.8 37.5 25.0 25.0
Woodford (22) 50.0 50.0 27.2 31.8
Wayne (12) 58.3 41.7 33.0 16.7
Recent research reveals that daughters received slaves from parents
more often than sons,129 which is supported by the results in Table 8.
The difference in preference may be understood in conjunction with
three prior tables, Tables 3, 4, and 5. Table 3 revealed that husband
testators often left most, if not all, of their property to their surviving
wives while Tables 4 and 5 showed that father testators left real property
to daughters and/or sons, albeit with a lesser frequency than surviving
wives. Devising real property to surviving wives and children without
labor threatened to diminish the value of the devise because labor would
need to be hired if the land was to be maintained and made profitable.
In addition to preserving the value of real property by transferring
enslaved labor to an owner of real property, the transfer of enslaved
persons to wives and children provided a possibility of future wealth.
Female enslaved persons might have children and those children would
be enslaved to the owner of the mother; therefore, the wealth resulting
126 Last Will and Testament ofJohn Conner, in BOONE COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK H
1861-1866, supra note 123, at 195-96.
127 See Inventory ofJohn Conner Estate, in BOONE COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK H 1861-
1866, supra note 123, at 287.
128 The numbers in parentheses indicates the number of wills containing provisions
that allocated enslaved persons to new owners. A transfer of slaves could involve two of
the parties listed in the table, such as a shared transfer of enslaved persons to a surviving
wife and daughter.
129 See STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS
SLAVE OWNERS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH xii (2019).
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from a bequest of a female slave might multiply. The additional value
derived from human property could be valuable to surviving wives and
daughters because human property could be sold if the land value or
crop earnings diminished. In that sense, transferring enslaved persons
to surviving wives and daughters - so long as they remained unmarried
- represented a form of insurance against loss that may have been more
important for females compared to males in the mid-nineteenth century
legal culture.
The traditional relationship between women and slavery portrays
women as lacking sufficient management skills as well as the ability to
wield authority like a "master" to engage in transactions involving
human beings.130 Slavery, in short, was the domain of men. Data from
the 1850 and 1860 Federal Censuses, however, shows that women
constituted somewhere near 40% of all slaveowners.131 To that end, the
preference for transferring enslaved persons to daughters changed those
daughters into slaveowners themselves.132 Once they became
slaveowners, women became active participants in the slave economy
vested with the authority to manage human property,133 which might
lead to transactional opportunities in the broader world. Slave-owning
females had an economic interest in the slave economy and could seek
to advance that interest in much the same way as men.
The results in Table 8 support the notion that women played a greater
role in the slave economy than traditionally recognized, but the nature
of the gifts that transferred enslaved persons may have limited the
extent to which some women could trade in human property. Instead
of making an unencumbered gift of slaves to wives, slave-owning
testators frequently limited the interests of surviving spouses to the
duration of their lives or continued widowhood. Following the standard
introductory clauses, the second clause of the 1861 will of Wayne
County's Squire Roberts stated that:
It is further my will and desire that my farm and landed
possessions, all my slaves, and all my stock of every kind and
130 See id.
131 Becky Little, The Massive, Overlooked Role of Female Slave Owners, HISTORY (Mar. 12,
2019), https://www.history.com/news/white-women-slaveowners-they-were-her-property
[https://perma.cc/4FCM-M6MH].
132 See JONES-ROGERS, supra note 129, at 2-3.
133 See id. at 3-8.
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sort, rest and remain in the possession of my beloved wife ...
during her natural life .... 134
Four clauses later, the will continues that:
My will and desire further is, that at the death of my wife ...
my entire estate aforesaid, real personal and mixed be sold on
such terms as my Executors may deem best and the proceeds
arising from said sale be equally divided among my children1 35
The following table, Table 9, shows that a majority of slave-owning
testators limited the ownership rights of surviving spouses to an interest
for the duration of life or continued widowhood.
Table 9. Percentage of Wills that Limited Property Rights of Surviving
Wives to Enslaved Persons in Boone, Wayne, and Woodford Counties
1860-1870136




The language employed by the slave-owning testators represented in
Table 9 indicates that they intended to pass an interest that did not
include full power to distribute human property, especially because of
the gift-overs in the granting clauses. Bequeathing an interest for the
"duration of life" suggests that the surviving spouse's interest ended at
her death, which meant that she could not include those slaves in any
will she might make because they immediately transferred to the
recipient of the gift-over. A surviving wife's life interest in enslaved
persons coincides with the life interest in real property - the enslaved
persons worked to make real property productive for the benefit of a
surviving wife during her life. Following a surviving wife's death, the
enslaved then labored for the recipient of the gift-over in the deceased
134 Last Will and Testament of Squire Roberts, in WAYNE COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK
A 1836-1901, at 144 (1861) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
135 Id. at 145.
136 The number in parentheses is the total number of wills utilized in the calculation.
For purposes of this table, the total number of wills includes only those wills where
slaves were distributed and a spouse is expressly mentioned in the terms of the will.
Wills that did not identify a spouse were excluded from the calculation. The results
include those gifts that were conditioned on remaining a widow because they also
indicated that something less than full control over the disposition of slaves was
intended by the testator.
2466 [Vol. 53:2433
2020] Antebellum and Postbellum Testamentary Transfers
husband's will. Despite the absence of testamentary control, a surviving
wife received the benefit of slave labor and had to manage the slaves
during her life, which likely broadened a widow's agency in ways that
may not have existed otherwise. Even gifts of property with limitations
from a decedent spouse could expand a woman's sphere of influence.
In addition to durational limits on the interests of surviving wives,
some testators drafted specific limitations on the ability of their
surviving wives to participate in the slave economy by restricting the
power to sell gifted slaves. Boone County's Harry Bannister executed his
will in 1859 with the provision that:
I devise to my wife Hannah Bannister my servant and slave
Reuben, during her life, and at her death, to return to my heirs,
and it is my will that he shall never be sold or hired except to
my said heirs.137
Moses Hawkins went one step further in his 1863 Woodford County
will by prohibiting the sale of a specific slave and providing that:
It is my will & desire that my faithful old servant Jim remain in
the possession of my wife as long as she lives to be treated with
great care & humanity & should he be living at her death &
physically incapable of supporting himself the sum of Seventy
five dollars per annum is to be set apart out of my estate and
retained by my Executor & by him appropriated to the support
& maintenance of said Servant Jim so long as he lives & is
hereby made a charge thereon for the purpose.138
Slave-owning testators who transferred an interest for life with a
restriction on the power of sale foreclosed the option to transfer during
the taker's life, which served as a barrier to full entry into the slave
economy.
Rather than perpetuating the enslavement of people by transferring
enslaved persons to new owners at death with or without restrictions,
testators in nineteenth century Kentucky possessed the t stamentary
authority to manumit slaves by will. 139 The testators in this sample,
137 Last Will and Testament of Harry Bannister, in BOONE COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK
H 1861-1866, at 303 (1864) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
138 Last Will and Testament of Moses Hawkins, in WOODFORD COUNTY WILL RECORD
BOOK R 1861-1867, at 393 (1864) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
139 See WICKLIFFE ET AL., supra note 55, at 643; Harry Toulmin, An Act to Reduce Into
One the Several Acts Respecting Slaves, Free Negroes, Mulattoes, and Indians, in A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE PUBLIC AND PERMANENT ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
KENTUCKY § 27, 308 (1802).
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however, generally chose not to exercise such transformational
authority to change enslaved individuals to freed people by will. In lieu
of immediate manumission, several slave-owning testators chose to
provide a path to freedom for their slaves in their wills. In Item 2 of her
1866 Woodford County will, Sarah Taylor declared:
It is my will and desire that my negro man slave named Henry
about twenty seven years old, who has been a faithful and
trustworthy servant, have the privilege of selecting a master and
that he be sold by my Executors or any of them to whomsoever
he selects regardless of price, my object being to provide him a
good and comfortable home, or if the said slave Henry prefers
his freedom then it is my will and desire that he be removed by
my said Executors or any of them beyond the limits of the State
of Kentucky to any free State he may select and there be
manumitted and set free by said Executors or any of them. 140
Upon first blush, one may wonder what might possess Henry to remain
enslaved in lieu of the opportunity to live as a free person in a free state.
Whatever impulse Henry may have had to exercise the choice to live
outside of Kentucky as a free person, however, may have been tempered
by his real-life circumstances. Henry may have had family nearby that
would remain enslaved after he chose freedom; therefore, Henry may
have understandably chosen a new owner near family members instead
of leaving the state for freedom. While Henry may have opted for
freedom and returned to Kentucky as a free person to be near his family,
such a decision carried a risk of losing a freedom paper, subsequent re-
enslavement with or without a freedom paper, and the associated fear
and hardship. As a result, Henry's decision may have been far more
difficult than it might seem on paper. The following table shows the
number of slaveowners that granted decision-making power about the
future to an enslaved individual.
140 Last Will and Testament of Sarah Taylor, in WOODFORD COUNTY WILL RECORD
BOOK T 1867-1870, at 257 (1866) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
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Table 10. Frequency of Mandatory or Optional Manumission in Wills
from Boone, Woodford, and Wayne Counties 1860-1870.141




As Table 10 shows, the possibility of freedom for slaves decreased as
the sampled counties move from north to south. In the northernmost
county, Boone County's shared border with the free state of Ohio may
have spurred some Boone County testators to execute wills that freed
slaves. By comparison, the location of Woodford County may have
insulated it from immediate messaging from abolitionist Ohioans.
Similarly, Wayne County residents were likely to be influenced by ideas
from the slave state of Tennessee on its southern border. In short, the
geographic location of the land on which the enslaved labored may have
impacted the possibility of freedom at the death of a slaveowner.
One of the few testators to grant unconditional freedom to an
enslaved individual also executed one of the most interesting wills in
the sample. In 1858, sixty-five-year-old Adam Brockman, "a man of
color," made a gift:
[B]equeathing to my wife Keziah Brockman, who was on the
25th day of September 1849 purchased by me ... and evidenced
by a "Bill of Sale" or Memorandum of Relinquishment in writing
her entire and absolute freedom after my death.142
After devising a plot of land in Kentucky to his daughter, a "woman of
color" who lived in Cincinnati, Brockman appointed an executor with
the last clause of his will:
[B] egging him to accept the appointment hereof, and with the
request that he will see that this my last will shall be fully and
specifically executed, and especially in relation to the freedom
of my wife Keziah.143
141 The numbers in parentheses following the county names represent the total
number of wills that included distributive provisions that allocated slaves at death.
142 Last Will and Testament of Adam Brockman, in BOONE COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK
H 1861-1866, at 549 (1865) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
143 Id.
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Without question, Brockman's primary testamentary intent was to
ensure freedom for his wife after his death and his selection of an
executor was critical to the effectuation of his intent.
Unlike Adam Brockman, slaveowners who executed wills after the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment did not need to consider how to
distribute slaves through their wills because that amendment changed
slaves from legal property to legal people.144 A review of the few wills
that were executed before the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment but
probated after the amendment illustrate the transformational effect in
bold relief. Woodford County's Robert Alexander executed a will in
March 1860 that benefitted his brother by granting him:
[A] 11 my lands houses & tenements in Woodford Co together
with all my negroes & stock of all sorts & kinds also all my
agricultural implements wagons harness pertaining to the farm
also all my carriages wagons & buggies & everything like
furniture pictures books & plate of which I am possessed either
in this County or abroad.145
At the time Alexander's will entered probate in 1867, however, the
Thirteenth Amendment barred transferring humans as wealth. As a
result, an 1868 inventory of Alexander's estate does not enumerate any
humans as assets of Alexander's estate.146 The absence of slaves in
Alexander's estate was not likely to be a simple mistake - the
meticulous inventory conducted by Alexander's executors consumes
eight, single-spaced pages in Will Record Book T and values the estate
at nearly $125,000.00.147 Similarly, Sarah Yowell's 1856 will distributed
144 One might hypothesize that the elimination of the option to transfer wealth in
the form of slaves by will to family members would change the estate plans of testators.
A testator might, for example, create a trust to benefit children as a measure of
protection against future financial hardship after 1865 in lieu of human property that
could be sold to generate income as needed. However, the number of express
testamentary trusts created before and after 1865 was almost identical, which suggests
that there was little to no change in the utilization of trusts as a wealth transfer
mechanism. In the alternative, a testator could simply have changed the proportion of
wealth to given takers to account for the absence of enslaved persons in an estate after
1865. For example, a testator could have devised more real property to daughters after
1865 to account for the wealth in the form of enslaved persons that would have been
legally transferable before 1865. The number of available inventories and appraisals for
testators who executed wills pre-1865 and then had their wills probated after 1865,
however, did not readily permit a comparison to be made.
145 Last Will and Testament of Robert Alexander, in WOODFORD COUNTY WILL RECORDS
BOOK T 1867-1870, at 127 (1867) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
146 See id. at 206.
147 See id. at 213.
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one portion of her slaves to one daughter and three sets of
grandchildren. 148 The March 1866 inventory of Yowell's estate,
however, does not list any human property as assets.149 While the
Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery as a legal institution, its
function in probate courts was to redefine "property" subject to transfer
at death by individuals like Robert Alexander and Sarah Yowell.
CONCLUSION
On a micro-level, the historical information warehoused in probate
court records is personal history. Wills and inventories record
information about a specific decedent's property and the choices made
regarding the disposition of her property. The property owned by a
decedent at death and the decisions made about the distribution of that
property convey non-trivial information about a testator. Robert
Alexander, for example, possessed great wealth that did not include
slaves, kept meticulous records as evidenced by his efforts to update his
estate plan, and sought to secure care for his children in the future,
including one who may not have been his biological child, by settling
trusts that designated them as beneficiaries.1 50 Jane Bristow's wealth, on
the other hand, included slaves, but she also sought to benefit her
children in the future using the most valuable property she owned at
death - her slaves. To transfer her wealth in human property, Jane
made gifts of slaves to her children and created a trust that held some
of her slaves for the benefit of one of her sons.151 Jane's reason for
treating some slaves differently from others is lost to history; any
investigation of probate records will likely raise questions for which the
paper trail will vanish.
More broadly, the results of this investigation of Boone, Woodford,
and Wayne County testators illustrate that probate records are archival
documents that reflect and foreshadow broader historical trends in the
aggregate. The absence of wills by married women in this sample
highlights the restrictions on married women imposed by Kentucky
148 See Last Will and Testament of Sarah Yowell, in WOODFORD COUNTY WILL RECORDS
BOOK S 1861-1867, at 454 (1866) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
149 See id. at 538-39. An entry from the Woodford County Court recorded with the
inventory suggests that the inventory was returned to the court and accepted for
recordation in June 1865. However, the court order appointing appraisers and the
inventory and appraisal undertaken pursuant to that order are dated March 1866. As a
result, the June 1865 date seems to be a mistake.
150 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
151 See Last Will and Testament ofJane Bristow, in BOONE COUNTY WILL RECORD BOOK
H 1861-1866, at 165 (1863) (on file with the UC Davis Law Review).
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statutory and common law. In some cases, married women sought and
obtained private legislative bills that expanded testamentary authority
as well as property rights. The natural extension of broadening property
rights for married women during life is the expansion of testamentary
authority at death, which ultimately occurred in Kentucky two decades
after this sample period. Similarly, slaveowners in this sample
distributed their human property in wills, placed them in trusts, or
manumitted them pursuant to the testamentary authority over property
owned at death. The passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, however,
eliminated humans from the definition of property; therefore,
testamentary instruments executed post-ratification exclude provisions
that transfer the ownership of one human to another. The Thirteenth
Amendment not only had a tangible impact on the lives of individuals
who were once enslaved, but also made a visible impact on the
yellowing pages of probate books in county courthouses in places where
slavery was a legal institution.
